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The MNC as an externally embedded organization: An investigation of 
embeddedness overlap in local subsidiary networks  
 
Abstract: 
MNCs have been conceptualized as differentiated networks that, in turn, are 
embedded in external networks. Previous research has predominantly focused on 
the embeddedness of established subsidiaries into their local environment, 
omitting to shed light on the phenomenon of headquarters linkages to the local 
context which creates embeddedness overlap. We develop a model of why MNCs 
develop overlapping linkages to local subsidiary networks even if the subsidiaries 
have grown out of the initial start-up phase. Using detailed information on 168 
European subsidiaries, we find that MNCs build and maintain more overlapping 
network ties when subsidiaries are high performers, hold important resources, 
operate in turbulent environments, and are closely connected to multinational 
actors as opposed to purely domestic firms. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years scholars have developed an increasing interest in the role of 
subsidiaries’ local networks (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Andersson, Holm & 
Forsgren, 2002). Local network relationships have been found to foster subsidiary 
innovation, e.g. by enabling the firm to appropriate valuable knowledge from the 
external environment (Hakanson & Nobel, 2001; Lehrer & Asakawa, 2002; 
Almeida & Phene, 2004; Jindra, Giroud & Scott-Kennel 2009), to drive 
subsidiary performance (Luo, 2001; Andersson et al., 2002), and to influence 
headquarters’ (HQs) ability to control (Andersson & Forsgren, 1996; Asakawa, 
1996). While research has primarily advanced by focusing on the subsidiary as 
the unit of analysis, there is little disagreement that headquarters maintain 
relationships to external actors as well. While many of these relationships 
constitute non-redundant ties (i.e. headquarters linkages to investment houses and 
shareholders, or a subsidiary linking up with a local supplier), evidence shows 
that headquarters and subsidiaries quite often share relationships with the same 
local actors (Forsgren, Holm & Johanson, 2005; Birkinshaw, Toulan & Arnold, 
2001).  
We define the simultaneous existence of linkages by parent and subsidiary to 
the same local actors as embeddedness overlap. Maintaining overlapping 
networks or relationships is potentially costly, triggering the immanent question 
why firms nevertheless opt for maintaining such relations. In this paper we 
examine this question and suggest that external and internal contingencies help to 
explain why firms rationally decide to maintain these overlapping networks. Our 
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general proposition is that embeddedness overlap is influenced by conditions in 
the subsidiary’s local environment, as well as the subsidiary’s position within the 
MNC. We present these ideas in a conceptual framework that allows us to provide 
an explanation of why HQs develop relationships to some local subsidiary 
networks while ignoring others. The framework is in line with previous work 
which investigates firm-internal as well as external factors and their relationship 
to structural phenomena of the MNC (e.g. Frost, Birkinshaw & Ensign, 2002; 
Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). 
We empirically test our framework and propositions on data of 168 European 
subsidiaries.  Our results confirm that embeddedness overlap occurs in situations 
in which the uncertainty in the local environment creates beneficial effects for HQ 
involvement and multinational business partners require MNCs to build 
overlapping relationships. Our results also suggest that embeddedness overlap is 
common to balance the power of resource rich subsidiaries. These findings open 
up a series of interesting research avenues as well as more novel managerial 
options for HQs struggling to control their overseas subunits. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the second section, we provide a review of 
the literature on subsidiary embeddedness and propose a conceptual framework to 
study embeddedness overlap. This discussion leads into the development of our 
research hypotheses on the drivers of HQ linkages to the local context. In the 
fourth section we outline our methodology. The fifth section describes the 
findings, and the sixth presents a discussion of the implications of our study.  
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2 Conceptual Background and Hypotheses 
External network embeddedness 
Based on the idea that firms are embedded in social networks (Granovetter, 1985; 
Burt, 1992; Uzzi, 1996; Dyer & Singh, 1998) modern conceptualizations see the 
MNC as an organization connected to external networks in multiple ways and on 
multiple levels (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Dacin, Ventresca & Beal, 1999). 
Despite the multi-level character of embeddedness, research in international 
business has mostly used the concept of subsidiary relational embeddedness. It is 
assumed that each subsidiary develops direct relationships of varying strength and 
intensity to actors in its local environment (Andersson et al., 1996, 2002). 
Subsidiary relational embeddedness to external actors has been shown to drive 
knowledge creation and performance (Hakanson & Nobel, 2001; Schmid & 
Schurig, 2003; Almeida & Phene, 2004; Holm, Holmström & Sharma, 2005; 
Boehe, 2007; Mu, Gnyawali & Hatfield, 2007; Luo, 2001; Andersson et al., 
2002). This is based on the reasoning that knowledge and capability development 
is facilitated through strong, trustful ties of mutual commitment that are able to 
transfer more fine-grained knowledge and information (Uzzi, 1996; Gulati, 1998).  
Obviously, HQs also do maintain networks themselves. First, previous 
literature has coined the term “disembedding” for the process in which HQs take 
over networks from the local subsidiary level (Dacin et al., 1999). To exemplar 
this, consider the following vignette: 
Puma AG, the renowned sports goods firm, has reorganized its external 
relationships to Footlocker – a world-wide operating distributor. Since 
Footlocker has centralized strongly its purchasing activities, Puma has 
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relocated the responsibility and management of this relationship from the 
subsidiary to the regional HQ level. 
 
Second, previous literature also mentions that HQs maintain relationships to 
the subsidiary network without disembedding the subsidiaries – creating a 
situation of embeddedness overlap. Of course, it is usually HQ managers who 
establish linkages to local markets in the start-up phase of subsidiaries. However, 
it is also important for HQs to be alert to established subsidiaries (e.g. Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1986). This stands against the argument that developing and maintaining 
relationships to the environment is costly and consumes managerial resources 
(Mizruchi & Galaskiewicz, 1994; Luo, 2003), especially in foreign locations 
(Chen, Chen & Ku, 2004). HQ linkages to actors to which their own subsidiaries 
are already connected seem to run counter the logic of efficiency (Williamson, 
1991; Burt, 1992) and the question arises under which circumstances this costly 
endeavor is worthwhile. Consider the following examples: 
 
At Boehringer Ingelheim, a German pharmaceutical company, the marketing 
staff of the Eastern European regional HQ maintains direct linkages to 
important customers and health care organizations in the Eastern European 
countries in order to understand developments in the highly turbulent 
pharmaceutical markets. These linkages help the regional HQ staff to exercise 
control over the 28 country operations, to defend strategies of standardization 
and harmonization of marketing approaches, and to perceive business 
opportunities which are often not perceived by the subsidiaries themselves. 
 
At Dental
1
, a Swiss medical technology firm with 25 subsidiaries worldwide, 
the headquarters maintains relatively strong linkages to the local 
subsidiaries’ key network partners such as universities, industry associations 
                                                 
1
 Firm name anonymized. 
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and research institutes, in order to complement knowledge acquisition and 
processing capacity of the subsidiaries. 
 
The examples provide some insight into the circumstances under which HQs 
develop relationships to external network partners in their subsidiaries’ networks 
– despite the costs involved. In the case of Boehringer Ingelheim, HQs’ desire to 
be able to control and influence their dispersed subsidiaries led the HQs to 
establish and maintain local relationships. This is also mirrored in recent literature 
(cf. Andersson, Forsgren & Holm 2007; Yamin & Forsgren, 2006). In the case of 
Dental, HQ staff helps the subsidiary to interpret the environment which has a 
positive effect on knowledge acquisition. 
While no single theory exists that predicts the factors that lead HQs and 
subsidiaries to maintain relationships to the same local actors, research provides 
initial clues that helped us to develop a theoretical framework linking the most 
prominent determinants of such embeddedness overlap. In line with broader 
network research, we suggest that relationship building is endogenous and 
dependent upon firm internal and external factors (environmental opportunities 
and threats) (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Luo, 2003). This approach is similar to 
studies linking characteristics of the firm and the environment to structural 
phenomena of the MNC (e.g. Frost et al., 2002; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). 
Figure 1 presents our framework. 
 
------------ Figure 1 about here ----------   
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2.1 External Determinants of Embeddedness Overlap  
Environmental pressures have for long been within the center of research on firm 
strategies and structures (e.g. Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005). Recently, a series of 
studies have suggested that overall characteristics of the environment influence 
the extent to which firms build external linkages (Beckman, Haunschild & 
Phillips, 2004; Koka, Madhavan & Prescott, 2006). While none of these authors 
has made a statement concerning embeddedness overlap, it is likely to assume 
that at least some of the environmental pressures will affect both headquarters and 
subsidiaries in the same way. This could lead to a potential overlap in their 
network ties. One factor that may potentially spur organizations to build 
relationships is environmental uncertainty (Beckman et al., 2004, Granovetter, 
1985; Koka et al., 2006; Holm et al., 2005). The second factor we are 
investigating is the extent to which the subsidiary’s external network is dominated 
by multinational firms as opposed to purely domestic firms. Compared to local 
actors, multinational network partners are likely to maintain linkages to the same 
firm in multiple locations, thus increasing the likelihood for embeddedness 
overlap. In the following we will look at each of them in turn. 
 
Environmental uncertainty 
Environmental uncertainty can be defined as a situation in which the amount of 
information required to perform a task is inferior to the amount of information 
possessed by the organization (Galbraith, 1973). Uncertainty also derives from 
intense competition that creates a high level of market instability (Porter, 1980). It 
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implies that many market opportunities and challenges emerge simultaneously. In 
such environments, the need for increased information gathering is higher (Luo, 
2003; Gupta, 1986) and a single dominant logic of interpretation should be 
avoided (Prahalad & Bettis, 1995; Birkinshaw & Lingblad, 2005). Consequently, 
researchers have claimed that firms need to involve several hierarchical levels to 
respond to turbulent environments (Hedlund, 1980), and that HQ’s own 
relationships to the local subsidiary networks help improve the information 
processing capacity of the MNC in the local environment (Birkinshaw et al., 
2001). In essence, HQs provide a different perspective and have diverse 
knowledge and competencies which help the firm in the turbulent local context. 
The dynamic nature of a particular market provides also strong opportunities to 
learn from that market (Frost, 2001; Holm et al., 2005). For example, uncertainty 
deriving from intense competition increases the likelihood that process and 
product innovations are developed (Porter, 1980). Thus, HQs might be interested 
in getting first-hand knowledge on the local developments and the nature of 
competitive rivalry (Holm, Johanson & Thilenius,1995; Yamin & Forsgren, 
2006).  
Hypothesis 1: Local environmental uncertainty is positively associated with 
embeddedness overlap in the subsidiary’s local network. 
 
Subsidiary Partner Multinationality 
As pointed out in our introduction, the changing business nature of key customers 
(and suppliers), may force firms to forgo efficiencies and deal with the same actor 
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at both a local and a global level.  When the external partners of the MNC become 
more global, interdependencies between markets are created. Some customers or 
suppliers might be connected to the focal MNC in several markets (Dacin et al., 
1999; Birkinshaw et al., 2001; Newburry, 2001). Interestingly, research on 
subsidiary embeddedness ignores to a large extent differences between diverse 
kinds of network partners
2
. We argue that embeddedness overlap is more likely to 
occur the higher the number of multinational partners in the subsidiaries’ 
networks as opposed to purely domestic firms. First, compared to purely domestic 
firms, multinational actors can have an impact on the MNC beyond the scope of 
the local market. Actions taken by an affiliate of a large MNC can be guided by 
the partner MNC and hence reflect strategic and tactical moves of the whole 
partner MNC. Furthermore, through subsidiary strategic initiatives, local units of 
multinationals are able to contribute to the strategic and tactical behavior of the 
partner MNC (Birkinshaw, 1996). Understanding such affiliates of multinationals 
might be worthwhile for HQs as well, as they reflect current or future strategies of 
the overall partner MNC. Second, Dunning (1998) argues that the presence of 
MNCs in a market is a sign that critical location-specific advantages are present. 
Since they could be a basis for the competitiveness of the MNC, foreign firms 
should trigger HQ attention to such actors (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008b). In 
                                                 
2
 To be precise, many studies do measure the level of embeddedness of subsidiaries with regard to 
different categories of external network partners. The categories distinguish between external and 
internal network partners and different kinds of organizations such as customers and suppliers, 
distributors, competitors, R&D institutions and government institutions. Yet, these partial 
embeddedness measures are mostly aggregated in order to derive an overall average measure for 
subsidiary embeddedness (e.g. Andersson et al., 2002). 
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sum, we hypothesize that the more a MNC’s subsidiary is connected to 
multinational actors, as opposed to purely domestic actors, the higher the 
incentive for the HQ to invest into own relationships to these actors which creates 
embeddedness overlap 
Hypothesis 2: The degree of multinationality of the subsidiary’s local network is 
positively associated with embeddedness overlap in the subsidiary’s local 
network. 
 
2.2 Internal Determinants of Embeddedness Overlap 
While external factors drive the likelihood of embeddedness overlap, we suggest 
that internal factors also have an effect. One prominent explanation of 
embeddedness overlap can be found in social exchange theory, or more 
specifically the literature on relational power within the MNC (Mudambi & 
Navarra, 2004; Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2007; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a). 
Theories of intraorganizational power suggest that the configuration of the MNC 
network, e.g. the position of a focal subsidiary, influences HQ’s attention and 
HQ’s attempt to increase its knowledge about the subsidiary and the context in 
which the subsidiary is embedded (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Nohria & Ghoshal, 
1997; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008b). We consider the subsidiary’s resource 
importance as well as its relative performance in our framework which has been 
used as key dimensions of a subsidiary’s position and strategic significance 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986; Jarillo & Martinez, 1990; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 
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2008b)
3
. This is in line with Cyert and March (1963) who argued that decision-
making heuristics are often simple-minded focusing on easy indicators of a 
subsidiary’s weight within the MNC. 
 
Subsidiary resource importance 
Subsidiary resource importance signifies the extent to which a subsidiary 
possesses resources upon which other units within the MNC depend. For 
example, they might undertake manufacturing on behalf of the entire MNC 
(Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997; Frost et al., 2002). Such strategically significant 
subsidiaries are powerful and trigger the attention of HQs (Bouquet & 
Birkinshaw, 2008b) and their interest in understanding the subsidiary’s local 
context. In fact, it is argued that HQ knowledge of the local context of such 
subsidiaries is crucial for effective management and the retention of power (Holm 
et al., 1995; Yamin & Forsgren, 2006; Andersson et al., 2007). The reason is that 
knowing and understanding a political network is in itself a source of power 
(Krackhardt, 1990). Furthermore, the subsidiary’s embeddedness is often 
considered to be the basis for the position of the subsidiary in the MNC in the first 
place (Yamin & Forsgren, 2006; Andersson et al., 2007; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 
1990; Garcia-Pont, Ignacio Canales & Noboa, 2009). It is logical, therefore, that 
the HQ moves its attention to these external actors. Therefore we hypothesize the 
following:  
                                                 
3
 Other variables which are also sometimes used to define subsidiary significance within the MNC 
network such as its autonomy or size are controlled for in the analysis. 
 13 
 
Hypothesis 3: The importance of subsidiary resources to others units within the 
MNC is positively associated with embeddedness overlap in the subsidiary’s local 
network. 
 
Subsidiary Past Performance 
The second indicator of subsidiary strategic significance is its past performance. 
The MNC depends more on subsidiaries that are high performers in terms of 
profitability than on low performers. Strong financial performance of a subsidiary 
means that the subsidiary contributes strongly to the performance of the whole 
MNC. This in turn increases the freedom for HQs to allocate financial resources 
to projects or units where it thinks it is most applicable. High levels of relative 
performance might also indicate that the subsidiary has a strong capability base. 
This is an indicator of potential know-how transfer from this subsidiary to other 
subsidiaries. To this end, past performance is an easy, relative objective way for 
the HQ to assess the local market and high levels of performance trigger their 
attention and interest in understanding more in detail of what is going on. 
Hypothesis 4: The past performance of the subsidiary is positively associated with 
embeddedness overlap in the subsidiary’s local network. 
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3 Methodology  
3.1 Sample and Data Collection 
The study involves 168 European subsidiaries of MNCs. The population list of 
more than 45000 subsidiaries was drawn from the AMADEUS database which 
contains data on European firms. Subsidiaries were defined as legal entities 
(firms) whose shareholders are other firms owning at least 51% of the subsidiary 
and residing abroad. A random sample of 1507 subsidiary companies was 
successfully contacted and received questionnaires. A number of efforts were 
taken to enhance response rates from the targeted senior subsidiary managers
4
. 
We conducted two follow-up calls after the initial mailing of the questionnaire. 
When requested, a hardcopy and/or pdf questionnaire was resent to the 
respondent. The assurance of confidentiality further aimed to reduce respondents‘ 
incentive to artificially inflate or disguise their responses. A total return of 193 
questionnaires represented a response rate of 12.8%. However, due to missing 
values the present analysis was conducted with a sample of 168 subsidiaries 
(11.1% of the target sample).  
The large majority of the subsidiaries belong to two manufacturing industries 
namely “Machinery” and “Chemicals, Petroleum, and Coal”. The subsidiaries are 
located in more than 26 countries with the largest countries, i.e. Germany, Spain, 
the United Kingdom, Poland and France, making up 40% of the sample. On 
                                                 
4
 We chose subsidiary heads / CEOs as our main informants. 
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average, the responding subsidiaries are 22.3 years old, achieve total sales of 
approximately 30 Mio. Euro, and operate with 131 employees. Regarding the 
location of the HQs, approximately one third of the firms are coming from 
Germany (18%) and Austria (13%). HQs located outside Europe (US, Japan) 
represent 11% of the sample.  
We analyzed non-response bias and late-response bias and found no 
significant differences
5
. To counter common method bias, we protected 
respondent anonymity to avoid consistency motif and social desirability, we used 
improved scale items after extensive pre-testing, and most of the constructs are 
based on well-established scales in the literature (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee & 
Podskaoff, 2003). The dependent variable (HQ local relationships) had a special 
question initiation to avoid social desirability (cf. Martinez & Jarillo, 1991; 
Harzing, 1999)
6. In addition, a Harman‘s one-factor test did not produce a single 
emerging factor (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). To validate the dependent variable, 
we also collected additional data via telephone from some of the subsidiaries’ 
headquarters and calculated an intra-class correlation coefficient. Resulting data 
of 120 external relationships showed a high consistency between subsidiary and 
                                                 
5
 To test for non-response bias we tested for equality of means and distribution similarity 
regarding the variables sales, age, and number of employees. This suggests that the sample is 
representative of the population of European foreign-owned subsidiaries as represented through 
the AMADEUS database. 
6
 For example, we initiated the question asking for HQ local relationships with a statement 
indicating that some firms use networks extensively while others do not to indicate that both 
answers are fine. 
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corresponding HQ responses (Intra Class Coefficient ICC = .72
7
). Consequently, 
we assume that common method bias is not a serious problem in this study. 
3.2 Measures 
Measures of all constructs were developed based on an in-depth review of the 
literature and the questionnaire was pretested by the research team and ten 
individuals.  
 
Embeddedness overlap 
We used two different measures to capture embeddedness overlap in the local 
network. First, we built a composite of the strength of the relationships that HQs 
maintain to several types of external partners to which also subsidiaries have built 
linkages. Instead of using a standard Likert scale, we used a graphical scale 
adapted from Ambos and Schlegelmilch (2007) and measured subsidiary and HQ 
external relationships with the same question. This approach proved useful in the 
pretests. It emphasizes that the HQ relationship strength needs to be indicated in 
relation to the subsidiary’s network partners and not to others. This is necessary as 
to capture overlap and not non-redundant ties. Respondents were asked to 
estimate on a 6 point scale the strength of the relationships between their 
subsidiary and the network actors, and their HQ and the same actors. The 
following local actors were given: domestic suppliers; domestic customers, local 
units of multinational suppliers, local units of multinational customers, local 
                                                 
7
 Two-way random effects model.  
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governments, and local industry associations. Based on this question, we 
computed a variable named “HQ local linkages”, which represents the composite 
strength of the HQ’s relationships to the six local actor categories. In an 
exploratory factor analysis we derived one single factor which explains 55.2 % of 
the variance. All loadings are significant with the smallest loading being .673 
(Construct reliability (CR) = .880
8
). 
Second, in order to be able to conduct a robustness test with a related but 
different dependent variable. We computed a second variable which combines 
HQ and subsidiary external relationships. We named this construct “Shared 
relationships”. It measures the percentage of shared relationships to the local 
network between the HQ and the respective subsidiary. Again, we took the 
subsidiary network as a baseline for the measure. If a subsidiary had indicated that 
it maintains relationships to three local actors and that its corresponding HQ is 
linked to one of those actors as well, the variable takes the value of .33. If a 
subsidiary had indicated that it maintains relationships to 5 actors and that its 
corresponding HQ is linked to all five of them, then “shared relationships” would 
be 1.  
 
Environmental Uncertainty  
                                                 
8
 Construct reliability (CR) was calculated as an alternative to Cronbach’s alpha due to the 
dependency of alpha on the number of items. We used the approach according to Hair et al. (2006) 
taking into account the square of the summed loadings and the sum of the error variance terms for 
the construct. 
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Uncertainty has been operationalized as a multidimensional construct consisting 
of technological turbulence, intensity of competition and market turbulence in the 
subsidiary market (Jaworski & Kohli 1993). We abridged the previously used 
scales and respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with the following 
conditions of the subsidiary market: “In your business, customers’ preferences 
change substantially over time”. “There is demand from customers who never 
bought your products before” (Market turbulence). “It is very difficult to forecast 
the technological development in the next three years”. “A large number of new 
product ideas have been made possible through technological breakthroughs in 
your industry” (Technological turbulence). “Competition in your market is very 
fierce”. “Heavy price competition is a characteristic of your industry” (Intensity 
of competition). Three two-item factors emerged for the three dimensions of 
uncertainty. However, the factor for technological turbulence turned out to be 
unreliable. We deleted these two items. Then, factor analysis produced two 
factors explaining 74.4 % of the variance. The first factor covers the first two 
items and was named “turbulence”. (CR =.82). The second construct was named 
“competition” and was built on the last two items. (CR = .85) 
 
Subsidiary Partner Multinationality 
We developed a new scale to measure the extent to which the subsidiary partners 
are rather multinational organizations as opposed to domestic actors. We used the 
subsidiary’s average strength of relationships to local units of multinational 
partners and regional industry associations and regional governments divided by 
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the subsidiary’s average strength of relationships to purely domestic partners 
(domestic suppliers, domestic customers, local industry associations and local 
governments). The higher this ratio, the more the subsidiary is connected to 
multinational partners as opposed to purely domestic partners. 
 
Subsidiary Resource Importance 
Subsidiary resource importance is defined as the extent to which resources of the 
subsidiary are important to other units within the MNC. We measured this 
construct with three Likert-type items. Respondents were asked to indicate the 
extent of resource outflows from the focal subsidiary to other subsidiaries of the 
MNC on a 6-point scale with regard to “technology know-how”, “manufacturing 
know-how”, and “product flows” (e.g. parts and finished products). The one 
emerging factor explained 77% of total variance (CR = .94).
9
  
 
Subsidiary Past Performance 
Subsidiary past performance was measured relative to other subsidiaries of the 
corporation on a scale between 1 (worse) to 5 (better). Respondents were asked to 
rate six performance indicators over the last three years: sales growth; market 
share; return on investment; profit; productivity; cash flow from operations. 
Through principal component analysis, we derived two factors explaining 72% of 
                                                 
9
 In order to check if the resource outflows are indeed important to the rest of the MNC we 
validated the scale with responses to another question which directly asked for the importance of 
the subsidiaries’ resources for other units. Correlations were highly significant and above .76. We 
did not use this importance scale because of a substantially higher number of missing values.  
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total variance. The factor “Sub Past Financial Performance” was developed from 
four indicators: return on investment, profit, productivity, and cash flow from 
operations. This factor represents the past financial performance of the subsidiary 
(CR = .88). The factor “Sub Past Market Performance” was constructed using 
sales growth and market share (CR = .85).  
 
Control variables 
In order to control for other effects than hypothesized, we used several control 
variables which we drew from previous literature. Subsidiary age was measured 
as the number of years between the subsidiary’s date of establishment and the 
year 2007. Subsidiary size was measured as the number of employees of the 
subsidiary
10
. We used two dummy variables as controls for formation of the 
subsidiary (greenfield investments and joint-ventures; baseline is acquired 
subsidiaries). We also controlled for the geographic distance between the HQ 
and the subsidiary. We created a dummy variable called “hostregiondummy” 
which indicated “1” for the long distance cases, i.e. when the HQ of the European 
subsidiary was from the U.S. and Japan, and “0” for the case that the HQ was 
located within Europe. On the firm-level, we are controlling for the organizational 
setup and strategy of the MNC by integrating the dummy variable “matrix 
organizational structure” into the analysis. The variable reflects if the MNC’s 
structure is based on more than one organizational dimension (regional, product, 
                                                 
10
 We used the natural logarithm of size and age. 
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or functional divisions). Furthermore, we include subsidiary autonomy since this 
variable is often assumed to shape the subsidiary’s mandate and role within the 
MNC (Paterson & Brock, 2002). The scale is built on four items: “Hiring and/or 
promoting top management in your subsidiary, formulating and approving your 
subsidiary’s annual budget, changing your subsidiary’s organization, increasing 
expenditures beyond budget” (five-point scale from 1: subsidiary decides 100% to 
5: parent decides 100%). Finally, we controlled for the overall level of economic 
development of the subsidiary location by measuring the gross domestic product 
per capita in purchasing power parity (data for 2007 from Eurostat). 
 
4 Analysis and Results 
To test our hypotheses, we used ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard 
errors as implemented in STATA 10.0, to counter effects of heteroscedasticity 
with the dependent variable HQ local relationships
11
. We checked for the 
assumptions of linearity, normality of errors, absence of multicollinearity, 
independence of errors, and no undue outliers or influential cases. Table 1 
contains an overview of means, standard deviations and correlations of the 
variables used in the model. The results of the regression analysis are depicted in 
Table 2. 
------ Table 1 about here ---------- 
                                                 
11
 Results were stable as compared to the calculation without robust standard errors. 
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Table 2 contains the results of the regression analysis. Model 1 presents all 
control variables which account for roughly 15% of the variance. Of these 
variables, subsidiary autonomy, subsidiary size, and entry mode “joint venture” 
are positively and significantly related to HQ local relationships. Subsidiary age 
and geographic distance (host region dummy) are negatively related to the 
dependent variable. In Model 2, we present the results pertaining to H1 to 4 in 
addition to the control variables. The prediction that uncertainty leads to the 
formation of HQ local relationships gained support only for the variable 
“turbulence” but not for “competition”. Results also show that the more the 
subsidiary is connected to multinational affiliates the more the HQ builds local 
relationships to these units. These data confirm H2. H3 and 4 suggested that 
headquarters will maintain linkages to actors in the subsidiaries local environment 
to limit the power of resource rich and well performing subsidiaries. An 
examination of the corresponding coefficients (subsidiary resource importance, 
subsidiary past market and financial performance) confirm such a relationship, 
thus supporting our two final hypotheses.  
 
---- Table 2 about here ---- 
 
Robustness Checks 
To validate our results, we estimated a fractional response model and exchanged 
“HQ local relationships” with the alternative dependent variable “Shared 
Relationships” which represents the percentage of shared relationships to the local 
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environment of the subsidiary
12
. The results are displayed in Table 3. Our findings 
are to a large extent validated with the alternative dependent variable. H1 receives 
support only for turbulence and not for the intensity of competition. H2 is 
supported with subsidiary partner multinationality being positively associated to 
the extent of shared relationships. H3 receives only limited support regarding the 
variable subsidiary resource importance with p=0.137. Subsidiary past 
performance (H4) shows mixed results. While financial performance is positively 
and significantly related to the extent of shared relationships at the 10% level 
(p=0.076), subsidiary market performance is not significant. Of the control 
variables, subsidiary autonomy, subsidiary age, size, and geographic distance 
confirm the results of the OLS regression with the original dependent variable. 
The overall model is highly significant and the ML Cox Snell R Square at 34%. 
---- Table 3 about here ---- 
 
5 Discussion 
The basic assumption of this study is that MNCs, such as any other kind of firm, 
are embedded in their external network and that this is one important 
characteristic of the organizational setup which drives organizational 
performance, survival and behavior. This study investigates the particular 
                                                 
12
 We follow Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and apply a fractional logit regression with robust 
standard errors. In this approach, E(y | x) is modeled as a logistic function, where y is the 
dependent variable and x is a set of regressors: E(y | x) = exp(xβ)/[1 + exp(xβ)]. This model 
ensures that the predicted values of y are in (0, 1). This fits our dependent variable since it is the 
percentage of shared relationship which varies hence between 0 and 1. The method is non-linear 
and can be estimated using quasi-maximum likelihood. 
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phenomenon of HQ local linkages and embeddedness overlap and extends the 
previous subsidiary-focused body of literature. We treat HQ local linkages as a 
form of attention from the HQ to the subsidiary context and hence as an 
investment by the HQ made only under certain circumstances. To our knowledge, 
this is one of the first attempts to measure this phenomenon and to investigate its 
antecedents. We develop a model that explains the phenomenon based on 
environmental and firm-internal factors.  
The level of environmental uncertainty in the local market is a driver of 
embeddedness overlap. However, there is only support for the hypothesis that 
uncertainty emanating from market turbulence is positively related to HQ local 
linkages and the extent of shared relationships. One reason for the insignificance 
of the competition variable might be the price pressure in competitive industries. 
In contrast to the level of overall environmental uncertainty as captured by the 
turbulence measure, the level of competition is also a sign of a mature industry in 
which there is substantial cost pressure (Birkinshaw & Lingblad, 2005). Prices 
tend to decrease when competition is very intense and firms might therefore 
eliminate redundant activities where possible and strive for efficiency in their 
operations. Hence, while HQ local linkages might be a countermeasure against 
increased competition, firms will still try to streamline their organizations and 
avoid the duplication of relationships to the external networks.  
Furthermore, we found that multinational network partners are more 
interesting to HQs than purely domestic actors. HQ attention to local networks is 
less driven by the existence of purely domestic actors since their behavior does 
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not reflect or impact several markets of the MNC, and they probably offer limited 
learning potentials to the HQ. Newburry and colleagues (Newburry, 2001; 
Newburry & Yakova, 2006) have used the construct “extent of shared clients” as 
an indicator for the level of subsidiary embeddedness. Shared clients indicate that 
the MNC is embedded to multinational organizations. Along the lines of 
institutional research (e.g. Roth & Kostova, 2003) Newburry and colleagues 
assume that subsidiaries with an independent client base (purely domestic firms) 
are in general more strongly locally embedded than subsidiaries sharing their 
clients with many other units. Post hoc analysis of our data regarding the average 
relationship strength of the subsidiary to the local network confirms the 
assumption of Newburry and colleagues (2001; 2006). Our data gives a two-fold 
picture: Subsidiaries connect to a stronger extent to domestic partners than to 
local units of multinational partners while the inverse is true for the HQs. This is 
in line with the suggestions by Dacin et al. (1999) who postulate that HQs 
external linkages substitute subsidiary embeddedness under increasing 
globalization. Only then can HQs coordinate multi-market customers and 
suppliers effectively (Birkinshaw et al., 2001). In contrast to Dacin et al. (1999), 
we show that intermediate situations exist in-between pure subsidiary 
embeddedness and a complete crowding out effect. This is an important novel 
finding since it calls for re-focusing research into the characteristics of the 
external partners (the portfolio or composition of the subsidiary network), and the 
effect of globalization on the creation and management of interorganizational 
relationships (Birkinshaw et al., 2001).  
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The data also shows support for the prediction that HQ attention to subsidiary 
networks and hence embeddedness overlap is triggered by the subsidiary’s 
positioning within the MNC as well as the apparent strategic significance as 
indicated by the subsidiary’s past performance relative to its peers. The 
importance of subsidiary resources to the rest of the MNC is clearly related to the 
extent of HQ local relationships and shared relationships. With regard to 
performance, financial performance seems to trigger HQ local relationship 
building rather than market performance which is not significant in our robustness 
test. 
 
5.1 Implications and future research 
Our findings have important implications. First, we contribute to the idea of a 
selection process HQ units apply when choosing on which subsidiaries and which 
subsidiary networks to focus on (Andersson et al., 2007). We extend the notion of 
attention (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008) in the sense that HQ attention to 
subsidiary matters also includes attention to the subsidiaries’ local networks. 
Second, selecting the appropriate subsidiaries and selecting where to build 
embeddedness overlap might help the HQ in balancing costs with respective 
benefits of their networking activities. Future research could build on our findings 
and investigate the outcome of HQ local relationships and embeddedness overlap, 
as well as the effectiveness of the balancing selection process. 
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Moreover, our study also has important implications for the conception of the 
differentiated network MNC and its management. The findings support the idea 
that HQs use external relationships to gather knowledge and to build 
understanding of the local context which can be useful to counter subsidiary 
influence (Andersson et al., 2007; Yamin & Forsgren, 2006). This view is further 
supported by our control variables. There is support for a positive relationship 
between the subsidiary’s size and HQ local relationships as well as the percentage 
of shared relationships. It is reasonable to assume that large subsidiaries are more 
likely to be powerful and resource-strong. 
Some authors also argue that subsidiary autonomy is an indicator of 
subsidiary power (Mudambi & Navarra, 2004). Since subsidiary autonomy is 
positively related to HQ local relationships as well as the extent of shared 
relationships, the results are consistent. The finding contradicts classic 
contingency theory which postulates high levels of subsidiary autonomy in case 
the HQ lacks knowledge and understanding of the local context (Nohria & 
Ghoshal, 1997). This is an important finding which confirms initial evidence by 
Forsgren et al. (2005). MNC HQs seem to leave decision-making autonomy to 
local subsidiaries despite having access to information about the local subsidiary 
network through their own relationships. In fact, subsidiaries might have no 
interest in relinquishing their autonomy even in situations the HQ knows what is 
going on. This is mirrored in MNC research showing that subsidiary autonomy 
might often rather been “taken” than “given” from the HQs, and that powerful 
subsidiaries can “avoid” control by the HQ (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Mudambi 
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& Navarra, 2004). Arguably, the MNC with its very dispersed and differentiated 
network might represent a context which is likely to produce such behavior: 
dependencies and control problems within the MNC continue to exist to a strong 
extent despite the internalization of the foreign activities. Interestingly, based on 
this finding, the notion of the externally embedded network MNC becomes 
different. In order to control and manage internalized foreign activities, HQ units 
relate selectively to local external networks. Hence, in addition to Ghoshal and 
Bartlett (1990), who claim that the HQ can assume the role of the powerful 
designer of the MNC organization due to its centrality in the intra-organizational 
network, we extend this perspective and suggest that the HQ’s role depends on its 
relationships to internal but also to external organizations. This is an interesting 
avenue for future research. It reveals a much more complex picture of how MNCs 
interact with environments on multiple levels and how this in turn shapes or is 
shaped by intra-organizational circumstances. In general, our findings call for 
more research using more complex concepts of MNC-environment interaction. 
Future research might also use theories of intraorganizational power within the 
MNC context (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a). However, it seems necessary that 
this research takes the external network into account which might often serve as 
the origin of powerful positions of subsidiaries (Andersson et al., 2007). 
5.2 Managerial relevance 
Our findings hold important information for managers at both HQ as well as 
subsidiary level. First, it is important to note that HQ managers might value direct 
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relationships to the local context instead of or in addition to the natural linkages 
they maintain to their subsidiaries – via traditional coordination and control 
mechanisms. They seem to give an unbiased picture of what is happening locally. 
Second, managers have to understand that the HQ decision to involve in local 
networks is a rational selection process guided by relevant issues on the agenda of 
the HQ: maintaining control, achieving coordination across the locations, 
increasing knowledge of the local context. Increased HQ involvement in general 
across all subsidiaries, however, is likely to be counterproductive since large costs 
are involved. 
 
5.3 Limitations  
This study is a first attempt to explain the phenomenon of embeddedness overlap 
and HQ relationships to local contexts of established subsidiaries. 
Notwithstanding the robustness of the results across the two alternative dependent 
variables and the lack of obvious bias, there are some limitations of this study. 
First, testing hypotheses in a cross-sectional research design primarily 
indicates association, not causality. Hence, it is necessary to interpret the results 
with caution. It is desirable to investigate longitudinally the relationships between 
the variables of this study. This might also help to investigate to what extent HQ 
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linkages established in the start-up phase of the subsidiary maintain important 
during the course of subsidiary development
13
. 
Second, we conducted our analysis on the nodal level (unit level) treating 
groups of external actors (such as suppliers and customers) as relevant partner 
categories. This was useful to get comparable data across different MNCs and is 
based on common approaches in the field (e.g. Luo, 2001). However, it creates a 
problem of aggregation. Future research could build on this and develop a more 
fine-grained measure of external relationships. 
Third, it could be argued that the purpose of HQ relationships to local partners 
is not only information-seeking and that the activity structure of the HQ might 
have an important impact. However, we assume that different types of HQs are 
randomly distributed in our sample. Furthermore, we have retested the results 
with a much smaller subsample and controlled for the size of the HQ unit (number 
of employees) and the number of subsidiaries reporting to the HQ. Both variables 
are not significant and the other hypothesized relationships remained stable with 
the exception of subsidiary market performance which became insignificant when 
predicting HQ local relationships. Finally, network theory postulates that there is 
no information diversity between partners when there is no structural hole 
between them (Burt, 1992; Zaheer & Soda, 2009). In other words, the collection 
of information and the built up of knowledge about the local context and the 
                                                 
13
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this comment. 
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subsidiary’s external relationships is a result of HQ’s own relationships to the 
local context no matter what their purpose is.  
Fourth, future research could validate our findings by investigating 
comparative measures of environmental and firm-internal characteristics. While 
we have used relative subsidiary performance compared to the subsidiary’s peers, 
other variables were measured on absolute scales. HQ investment into local 
linkages might rather be guided by relative uncertainty of a subsidiary market 
compared to other subsidiaries. While we claim that the subsidiary perceptions are 
still relevant because they get transferred to the HQ through issue-selling and 
profile-building activities, future research could use HQ-informed relative 
variables. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
MNC internal characteristics
• Subsidiary resource position
• Subsidiary past performance
Environmental characteristics
• Environmental uncertainty
• Presence of  multinational corporations
HQ linkages to the local 
subsidiary network
Control variables
Subsidiary  autonomy; Subsidiary formation; 
Subsidiary age and size; MNC structure; 
Geographical distance; Subsidiary country 
GDP; HQ size; HQ control span
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Table 1: Means, standard deviations and correlations  
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 HQ local relationships 1.000                
2 Shared relationships 0.798 1.000               
3 Sub Autonomy 0.130 0.090 1.000              
4 Dummy Greenfield -0.171 -0.143 0.012 1.000             
5 Dummy Joint Venture 0.158 0.128 -0.021 -0.297 1.000            
6 Sub Age -0.172 -0.219 0.019 0.119 -0.036 1.000           
7 Sub Size 0.182 0.195 0.032 -0.185 0.085 0.113 1.000          
8 Dummy Matrix Structure 0.044 0.080 -0.009 -0.002 0.142 -0.092 0.063 1.000         
9 Dummy Host Region -0.152 -0.165 0.068 -0.140 0.067 0.056 0.066 0.012 1.000        
10 GDP per Capita -0.105 -0.147 -0.112 -0.081 -0.124 0.282 -0.025 0.029 0.162 1.000       
11 Competition 0.013 -0.049 -0.076 0.018 0.164 0.013 0.051 0.071 0.028 -0.014 1.000      
12 Turbulence 0.157 0.166 -0.052 -0.085 -0.097 -0.029 0.075 -0.071 -0.039 0.071 -0.036 1.000     
13 Sub Resource Imp. 0.283 0.269 0.042 -0.311 0.263 -0.161 0.227 0.050 0.233 0.006 0.036 -0.004 1.000    
14 Sub Past Market Perf. 0.126 0.051 -0.110 0.116 -0.151 -0.008 -0.030 -0.051 -0.033 0.100 0.007 0.028 0.064 1.000   
15 Sub Past Financial Perf. 0.191 0.193 -0.102 0.033 0.055 -0.047 -0.105 -0.032 -0.073 -0.103 -0.068 0.068 0.100 0.003 1.000  
16 Sub Partner Multination. 0.210 0.214 0.063 -0.104 -0.004 0.090 0.045 0.032 0.101 0.095 -0.177 -0.079 0.113 0.028 0.055 1.000 
                  
 Mean 0.046 0.679 -0.034 0.369 0.131 1.145 2.258 0.179 0.125 96.913 -0.007 0.006 0.082 0.028 0.023 0.743 
 Std. Dev. 0.997 0.306 1.014 0.484 0.338 0.421 0.567 0.384 0.332 29.035 0.990 0.997 0.993 0.982 1.008 0.467 
 
Sub = Subsidiary 
Perf. = Performance 
Multination. = Multinationality 
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Table 2: Results of OLS regression analysis with robust standard errors. Dependent 
variable “HQ local relationships”. 
 
 Variables Expected 
relationship 
Model 1 Model 2 
 Constant  -0.090 -0.311 
   (0.374) (0.373) 
 Sub Autonomy  0.141** 0.164** 
   (0.071) (0.069) 
 Dummy Sub is Greenfield  -0.230 -0.136 
   (0.170) (0.161) 
 Dummy Sub is Joint Venture  0.349* 0.320 
   (0.204) (0.218) 
 Sub Age (log)  -0.394* -0.322* 
   (0.201) (0.186) 
 Sub Size (log)  0.312** 0.247** 
   (0.123) (0.116) 
 Dummy Matrix structure  0.009 0.041 
   (0.203) (0.192) 
 Dummy host region  -0.562*** -0.652*** 
   (0.195) (0.180) 
 GDP per capita  -0.000 -0.001 
   (0.003) (0.002) 
H1 
Competition H1a: +  0.055 
   (0.068) 
Turbulence H1b: +  0.156** 
    (0.069) 
H2 Sub Partner Multinationality H2:  +  0.453*** 
    (0.155) 
H3 Sub Resource Importance H3: +  0.173** 
    (0.084) 
H4 
Sub Past Market Performance H4a: +  0.149** 
   (0.068) 
Sub Past Financial Performance H4b: +  0.156** 
   (0.070) 
 Observations  168 168 
 F  6.10*** 6.19*** 
 R-squared  0.146 0.303 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Sub = Subsidiary  
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Table 3: Results of fractional response model (maximum likelihood) with robust 
standard errors. Dependent variable “Shared Relationships”. 
 
Variables Model 1 
Constant -0.512  
 (0.684)  
Sub Autonomy 0.205 * 
 (0.106)  
Dummy Sub is Greenfield -0.107  
 (0.244)  
Dummy Sub is Joint Venture 0.371  
 (0.368)  
Sub Age (log) -0.706 ** 
 (0.342)  
Sub Size (log) 0.434 ** 
 (0.173)  
Dummy Matrix structure 0.097  
 (0.295)  
Dummy host region -1.243 *** 
 (0.312)  
GDP per capita -0.002  
 (0.004)  
Competition -0.001  
 (0.125)  
Turbulence 0.243 ** 
 (0.108)  
Sub Partner Multinationality 2.178 *** 
 (0.485)  
Sub Resource Importance 0.214 
1) 
 (0.144)  
Sub Past Market Performance 0.086  
 (0.098)  
Sub Past Financial Performance 0.209 * 
 (0.118)  
Observations 168  
Log pseudolikelihood   -72.085  
Model Chi Square 56.600 *** 
ML Cox Snell R2 0.339  
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1) significance: 0.137 
Sub = Subsidiary.  
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